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MONETARY AND FISCAL POLICY SWITCHING
TROY DAVIG, ERIC M. LEEPER, AND HESS CHUNG
Abstract. A growing body of evidence ﬁnds that policy reaction functions vary
substantially over diﬀerent periods in the United States. This paper explores how
moving to an environment in which monetary and ﬁscal regimes evolve according to
a Markov process can change the impacts of policy shocks. In one regime monetary
policy follows the Taylor principle and taxes rise strongly with debt; in another
regime the Taylor principle fails to hold and taxes are exogenous. An example
shows that a unique bounded non-Ricardian equilibrium exists in this environment.
A computational model illustrates that because agents’ decision rules embed the
probability that policies will change in the future, monetary and tax shocks always
produce wealth eﬀects. When it is possible that ﬁscal policy will be unresponsive
to debt at times, active monetary policy (like a Taylor rule) in one regime is not
suﬃcient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime and it can have
the unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand
eﬀects of tax shocks. The paper also considers the implications of policy switching
for two empirical issues.
1. Introduction
Two themes run through policy analysis: rules determining policy choice are func-
tions of economic conditions; those rules may change over time. The themes reﬂect
the views that actual policy behavior is purposeful, rather than arbitrary, and that
good policy adapts to changes in the structure of the economy or to improvements in
understanding how policy aﬀects the economy.
A growing body of evidence ﬁnds that policy reaction functions vary substantially
over diﬀerent periods in the United States.
1 In light of this evidence of regime shifts,
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it is surprising that there is little formal modeling of environments where on-going
regime change is stochastic and the objects subject to change are parameters deter-
mining how the economy feeds back to policy choice.
This paper is the ﬁrst step of a broader research agenda that explores how moving
to environments in which monetary and ﬁscal regimes evolve according to a Markov
process can change the impacts of and, more generally, the analysis of monetary and
ﬁscal policies. We consider interest rate rules for monetary policy and tax rules for
ﬁscal policy; the rules switch stochastically between two regimes. In one regime mon-
etary policy follows the Taylor (1993) principle and taxes rise strongly with increases
in the real value of government debt; in another regime the Taylor principle fails to
hold and taxes follow an exogenous stochastic process. Using convenient speciﬁcations
of policy rules, an analytical example shows that a unique bounded non-Ricardian
equilibrium exists in this environment.
More standard forms of policy rules require that the model be solved numerically.
We use a computational model to derive the impacts of exogenous changes in mone-
tary and tax policies in a regime-switching environment and contrast those impacts
with their ﬁxed-regime counterparts. When regimes switch, agents’ decision rules
embed the probability that policies will change in the future and, in consequence,
monetary and tax shocks always produce wealth eﬀects. Conventional ﬁxed-regime
analyses have found that active monetary policy (like a Taylor rule), which is designed
to stabilize aggregate demand and inﬂation, requires that ﬁscal policy adjust taxes
in response to debt. In contrast, when regimes change and it is possible that taxes
will be unresponsive to debt at times, active monetary policy in one regime is not
suﬃcient to insulate the economy against tax shocks in that regime, and may have the
unintended consequence of amplifying and propagating the aggregate demand eﬀects
of tax shocks.
The paper also considers the implications of policy switching for two empirical
issues. First, the “price puzzle” that plagues monetary VARs is a natural outcome
of periods when monetary policy fails to obey the Taylor principle and taxes do
not respond to the state of government indebtedness. Second, dynamic correlations
between ﬁscal surpluses and government liabilities, which have been interpreted as
consistent with Ricardian Equivalence, can be produced by an underlying equilibrium
that is non-Ricardian.
1For example, see Taylor (1999a) or Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) for estimates of monetary
policy rules and Taylor (2000) or Auerbach (2002) for estimates of tax policy rules. Favero and
Monacelli (2003) explicitly model regime switching in their estimates of monetary and tax policy
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Because we are driven to model regime switching by actual policy behavior in the
United States, it is useful to review the evidence.
1.1. A Quick Post-WW II History of Regime Change. Many macroeconomists
believe that U.S. monetary policy changed regime in late 1979. The view holds that
monetary policy changed from a period where increases in inﬂation were passively
accommodated to one where incipient inﬂation was actively combatted with tighter
policy.
2 Taylor (1999a), Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000), and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2003b), among others, found that from 1960-1979 the Fed followed an interest rate
rule that responded only weakly to inﬂation, failing to satisfy the Taylor principle.
Since the early 1980s, the Taylor principle is satisﬁed, according to this empirical
work. But even the most sanguine observers of recent Fed successes cannot exclude
the possibility of a return to the days when monetary policy accommodated inﬂation,
as in Sargent’s (1999) analysis of American inﬂation.
Less well appreciated is the fact that ﬁscal policy may also have experienced changes
in regime.
3 In some periods, taxes are adjusted passively in response to changing
debt levels; at other times, tax changes are active attempts to achieve non-budgetary
macroeconomic goals.
The history of tax policy illustrates the pendulum swings in policy. In the 1950s
taxes were increased three times on the grounds of budget balancing, in large part to
ﬁnance the Korean War [Ohanian (1997)]. By the 1960s, with the rise of the “new
economics,” tax changes were initiated primarily as a countercyclical tool [Heller
(1967)]. Budget balance had slipped into the background of tax debates. This trend
continued for two decades. The resulting explosion in Federal government debt and its
associated interest payments shifted priorities once again toward budget balancing,
and eventually in the 1980s and 1990s, Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton all
signed legislation that raised taxes to reduce budget deﬁcits. By the time the tax
cut of 2001 was ratiﬁed by Congress, the rationale had shifted from budget concerns
to economic stimulus. Both of the last two tax reductions–2002 and 2003–were
unambiguously motivated by countercyclical objectives. Evidently over the past 50
years ﬁscal policy behavior has ﬂuctuated between periods when taxes were adjusted
in response to the state of government indebtedness and those when other priorities
drove tax decisions.
That both monetary and ﬁscal regimes have ﬂuctuated is conﬁrmed by Favero
and Monacelli (2003) who explicitly model regime switching in their estimates of
2Sargent (1999) and Cogley and Sargent (2002a,b) are consistent with this view, but see Bernanke
and Mihov (1998), Sims and Zha (2002), and Hanson (2003) for an alternative view.
3For details see Pechman (1987), Poterba (1994), Stein (1996), Steuerle (2002), and Yang (2003).POLICY SWITCHING 4
monetary and tax policy rules in the United States. Taylor (1996, 2000) and Auerbach
(2002) document changes in the responsiveness of taxes to macro conditions, providing
further evidence that tax policy rules changed.
Against this history of shifts in policy rules, we use very simple models to take
ﬁrst steps toward examining the implications of the kinds of regime changes that
the United States has actually experienced. Although stark, the models highlight
that regime switching generates mechanisms that will continue to be present in richer
models where the mechanisms are harder to isolate.
2. Contacts with the Literature
This paper makes contact with existing work in several areas. Sargent and Wallace
(1981) were among the ﬁrst to emphasize intertemporal aspects of monetary and ﬁscal
policy interactions. With monetary and ﬁscal policy, there are two policy authorities
that jointly determine the price level and ensure the government is solvent. When
one policy authority pursues its objective unconstrained by the behavior of the other
authority, its behavior is “active,” whereas the constrained authority’s behavior is
“passive.”
4
If policy regime is ﬁxed, active monetary policy coupled with passive ﬁscal policy–
the policy mix implicit in the literature on the Taylor principle–produces conven-
tional monetarist and Ricardian predictions of monetary and ﬁscal policy impacts.
In contrast, when active ﬁscal policy combines with passive monetary policy–the
combination associated with the ﬁscal theory of the price level
5–monetary and tax
changes generate wealth eﬀects that shift aggregate demand, and policy impacts are
non-monetarist and non-Ricardian.
Lucas (1976) taught macroeconomists to think about policy changes in terms of
shifts in regime. But Lucas’s examples all involve once-and-for-all changes, rather
than the on-going process described in the history above. Cooley, LeRoy, and Raymon
(1982, 1984), among others, have argued that treating policy as making once-and-
for-all choices is logically inconsistent. After all, if policy authorities can contemplate
changing regime, then regime is not permanent. If there has been a history of changes
in policy regimes, private agents will ascribe a probability distribution over those
regimes. Agents’ expectations, and therefore their decision rules, will reﬂect their
belief that policy changes are not once-and-for-all. This point resonates especially
crisply in the United States, where the policy changes we aim to model areintrinsically
temporary; they arose largely because of the personalities of the political players,
4This follows Leeper’s (1991) taxonomy.
5See, for example, Leeper (1991), Sims (1994), Woodford (1995), and Cochrane (1999).POLICY SWITCHING 5
rather than through the creation of new policy institutions or changes in existing
institutions’ legal mandates.
Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000, p. 149) argue that when the Fed failed to obey
the Taylor principle before 1979, it left “open the possibility of bursts of inﬂation
and output that result from self-fulﬁlling changes in expectations.” The possibility
of multiple equilibria relies on the implicit assumption that ﬁscal policy was passive
during this period. Woodford (1999) suggests that ﬁscal policy may have been active
during that period, implying that observed inﬂation emerged from a unique equilib-
rium. Favero and Monacelli (2003) and Sala (2003) oﬀer empirical evidence that ﬁscal
policy was active and monetary policy was passive in the 1960s and 1970s, supporting
Woodford’s argument.
All this work is couched in terms of changes in policy regime, and there have
been some eﬀorts to incorporate switching policy speciﬁcations into dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium models to study the ﬁscal theory of price level determina-
tion (FTPL) [Sims (1997), Woodford (1998), Loyo (1999), Mackowiak (2002), Weil
(2003), and Daniel (2003)]. But each of these papers considers only one-time changes
in regime. In addition, Loyo (1999), Weil (2003), and Daniel (2003) consider only
changes in ﬁscal regime, holding monetary policy behavior ﬁxed. Given a history
of both monetary and ﬁscal regime switching, it is important to allow both policies
to change. This paper generalizes the theoretical literature on monetary and ﬁscal
policy interactions by explicitly modeling regime change as an on-going process. Both
one-time changes in regime and changes in only ﬁscal or monetary policy behavior
are special cases of our speciﬁcation.
There is work that models on-going regime change [Andolfatto and Gomme (2003),
Davig (2002, 2003), Leeper and Zha (2003), Schorfheide (2003), and Andolfatto,
Hendry, and Moran (2002)]. That work considers only exogenous processes for policy
variables that switch regime. This paper makes substantive and technical contribu-
tions by extending work on on-going regime change to allow the objects subject to
change to be parameters that determine how the economy feeds back to policy choice.
This is the ﬁrst example of which we are aware that allows for regime switching in
parameters of endogenous policy rules in an equilibrium model, where the parameters
determine existence and uniqueness.
Empirical ﬁndings that policy regimes have changed in important ways are diﬃ-
cult to interpret without theory that models regime changes explicitly [Favero and
Monacelli (2003) and Sala (2003)]. This paper ﬁlls some of the theoretical holes.
Finally, the paper connects to two bodies of empirical work. It oﬀers an interpre-
tation of the price puzzle in monetary VARs that diﬀers from the cost channel putPOLICY SWITCHING 6
forth by Barth and Ramey (2002) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001).
The paper also provides a counterexample to the empirical inferences drawn by Bohn
(1998) and Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) about the behavior of ﬁscal policy in
the United States.
3. An Analytical Example with Regime Switching
Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001) (CCD) argue that Ricardian equilibria are, in a
certain sense, more general than non-Ricardian equilibria. They make this argument
by proving a proposition that states that over time the response of the government
surplus to total government liabilities merely needs to be bounded away from zero
inﬁnitely often for the equilibrium to exhibit Ricardian Equivalence. The key point
is that the private sector must expect taxes to adjust “sooner or later,” though the
adjustment can be arbitrarily small and infrequent. Because the proposition does
not require the ﬁscal response to be strong enough to make the evolution of govern-
ment debt stable, the Ricardian equilibria CCD consider are potentially ones with an
unbounded debt-output ratio.
Equilibria with unbounded debt-output ratios may not be the most interesting or
relevant ones to consider. And they may be misleading if the impacts of taxes hinge
on the unboundedness assumption. Unbounded debt-output ratios are well outside
any country’s experience, so it is impossible to tell if policy authorities would permit
such equilibria to occur. It is quite possible that if a country’s policies made its debt-
output ratio appear to grow without limit, the country would undergo fundamental
macro policy reforms of the type that neither we nor CCD consider. We assume the
political process ensures the debt-output ratio is bounded.
This section presents an analytical example in which policies that satisfy the as-
sumptions of CCD’s proposition deliver a non-Ricardian equilibrium that is unique
within the set of equilibria with bounded debt-output ratios. Important conclusions
appear to hinge on CCD’s assumption of unboundedness.
Consider a constant endowment version of Sidrauski (1967), modiﬁed to include an
interest rate rule for monetary policy and a tax rule for ﬁscal policy. If government
consumption is constant, then in equilibrium the representative agent’s consumption,
c, is also constant, as is the real interest rate. Preferences over consumption and real
money balances are logarithmic. This model implies a Fisher equation
1/Rt = βEt [1/πt+1], (1)
where 0 <β<1 is the discount factor, Rt is the gross nominal interest rate on one-
period nominal government debt, πt+1 is the gross inﬂation rate between t and t +1,POLICY SWITCHING 7
and the expectation is taken with respect to a set Ωt that contains information dated





where mt = Mt/Pt is the real value of money balances.
Monetary policy adjusts the nominal interest rate in response to inﬂation according
to the rule
Rt =e x p( α0 + α(St)ˆ πt + θt), (3)
where b πt ≡ lnπt,θ t is an i.i.d. shock, St is the current regime and α(St) is a regime-
dependent parameter. Tax policy follows a rule that adjusts lump-sum taxes in
response to the real value of total government liabilities:
τt = γ0 + γ(St)(bt−1 + mt−1)+ψt, (4)
where τt is the level of lump-sum taxes, bt−1 = Bt−1/Pt−1 and mt−1 are the real values
of debt and money at the beginning of period t, and ψt is an i.i.d. disturbance. The
response of taxes to liabilities takes on values that depend on the realization of regime.
St obeys an N-state Markov chain with transition probabilities P [St = j|St−1 = i]=
pij,where i,j ∈ {1,N}.
The government’s ﬂow budget identity holds at each date t ≥ 0:
Bt + Mt
Pt




given initial nominal liabilities M−1 > 0,R −1B−1 > 0.
6












where the equality comes from using the Fisher equation. Combining (1) and (3) and
using (6), the inﬂation process obeys
b πt+1 = α(St)b πt + α0 + θt − b ηt+1 +l nβ. (7)
6By assuming initial government debt is positive, we do not address the criticism that the ﬁscal
theory of the price level falls apart when B−1 =0 . The criticism is made in a perfect foresight model
by Niepelt (2001) and countered in a stochastic model with incomplete markets by Daniel (2003).POLICY SWITCHING 8
Let lt = bt + mt. Equations (4) and (5) together with (2) imply that government










c + D − ψt. (8)
where D = g − γ0.




= γ; (ii) γ satisﬁes |1/β − γ| > 1; (iii) the inﬂation
process given by (7) is stable in expectation (that is, Etπt+k < ∞ for all k). As-
s u m p t i o n s( i )a n d( i i )m e a nt h a to na v e r a g eﬁscal policy is active and assumption
(iii) means that on average monetary policy is passive (the Taylor principle does not
hold on average).7
























To solve (9), take expectations as of t−1, apply the law of iterated expectations, and




assumption that Et[γt+1]=γ, (9) becomes











1/β − γ − 1
¶
. (10)





, which is positive if D/c <
1/β.T h ev a l u eo fηt is obtained from the budget constraint after substituting in the
value of l:
ηt = β










Equation (11) is the unique equilibrium mapping from the tax disturbance, ψt, and
the realization of the tax feedback parameter, γ(St), to the forecast error in inﬂation.
The solution for η and the stable inﬂation process, (7), uniquely determine inﬂation.
For an equilibrium of this type to exist, we restrict the parameters to assure that
ηt, which is the ratio of two positive numbers, is positive for any realization of ψt.
As u ﬃciently small value for D/c, coupled with a suﬃciently high bounded negative
support for ψ will do the job.
7Appendices B and C provide the stability conditions for the inﬂation process.POLICY SWITCHING 9
As a concrete example, suppose there are two regimes, N =2 , and that the policy
parameters take on the values
α(St)=
½
α(1) for St =1
α(2) for St =2
γ (St)=
½
γ(1) for St =1
γ(2) for St =2
.
Further suppose that α(1) and α(2) are suﬃciently small such that, given the transi-
tion probabilities, the inﬂation process, (7), is stable in expectation. The assumption
that the tax parameters have constant mean implies
E[γt+j |St =1 ,Ωt]=γ(1)p11 + γ(2)p21







¯ > 1. If either γ(1) or γ(2) is positive and jointly they
satisfy (12), then the model satisﬁes CCD’s premise that taxes adjust to debt inﬁnitely
often. But as (11) makes clear, negative tax disturbances generate wealth eﬀects that
raise the inﬂation rate. The only equilibrium with bounded debt is non-Ricardian.
This does not deny the existence of Ricardian equilibria of the kind that CCD
emphasize. But if those equilibria do exist, they must imply debt-output ratios that
grow without bound.
4. A Computational Model
We turn now to a variant on the model in section 3, which is less convenient
analytically but more closely tied to actual policy behavior. Because the variant does
not admit an analytical solution, we use Coleman’s (1991) monotone map method to
ﬁnd a ﬁxed point in the economy’s decision rules.
4.1. Households. As before, the representative consumer receives a constant en-
dowment each period, yt = y, of which a constant gt = g<yis consumed by the
government. Agents choose consumption, ct, and decide how to allocate portfolio















where δ>0. The household takes initial nominal assets as given: M−1 > 0,R −1B−1 >
0. Expectations at date t are taken with respect to Ωt. Policy is the sole source of
uncertainty.POLICY SWITCHING 10
In equilibrium, ct = c = y − g and the ﬁrst-order necessary conditions reduce to







The optimal paths for real balances and bonds must also satisfy their respective
transversality conditions.
4.2. Policy Speciﬁcation. The policy speciﬁcations in the computational model
connect to existing literature and actual policy behavior. The monetary and tax
rules are:
Rt = α0(St)+α1(St)πt + θt, (16)
τt = γ0(St)+γ1(St)bt−1 + ψt, (17)
where St ∈ {1,2},θ t ∼ IDN(0,σ 2
θ) and ψt ∼ IDN(0,σ 2
ψ). The reaction coeﬃcients
take values that depend on regime:
αi (St)=
½
αi(1) for St =1
αi(2) for St =2
, for i = {0,1}, (18)
γj (St)=
½
γj(1) for St =1
γj(2) for St =2
, for j = {0,1}. (19)
In this economy with perpetually full employment, an interest rate rule for mon-
etary policy is clearly not optimal. If anything, it will reduce private welfare. We
employ (16) for two reasons. First, it closely resembles monetary policy rules that
have received detailed study in recent years [Taylor (1999b)]. Second, (16) produces
features of an equilibrium that will continue to hold in models with frictions in which
rules from the general class to which (16) belongs are optimal. Fiscal rules like (17)
that make taxes respond to debt (rather than total liabilities, as in (4)) are widely
used in model simulations [Bryant, Hooper, and Mann (1993)], analytical studies of
monetary and ﬁscal policy interactions [Leeper (1991), or Sims (1997)], and empirical
work [Favero and Monacelli (2003)]. Speciﬁcation (4) has the conceptually appealing
feature that it separates monetary and ﬁscal policy: an open-market operation that
has oﬀsetting eﬀects on m and b does not aﬀect taxes under (4), while it does under
(17). Speciﬁcation (17), however, has the realistic feature that ﬁscal authorities re-
spond to the state of government debt, rather than the sum of debt and high-powered
money.POLICY SWITCHING 11
The government uses a combination of lump-sum taxes, new one-period nominal
bonds and money creation to ﬁnance government purchases and debt payments and
satisfy the government’s ﬂow budget identity, (5).
In a ﬁxed-regime version of this model, Leeper (1991) shows that existence and
uniqueness depend on the policy feedback parameters. In a linear approximation
to the model, a monetary authority that reacts aggressively to inﬂation, |α1β| > 1
combined with a ﬁscal authority that raises taxes suﬃciently to cover interest pay-





¯ < 1, imply a locally unique equilibrium
consistent with Ricardian equivalence. This policy combination is referred to as ac-
tive monetary and passive ﬁscal policy (AM/PF).8 A monetary authority that reacts






¯ > 1, imply a locally unique equilibrium where the path of taxes
aﬀects the inﬂation rate. This policy combination is referred to as passive monetary
and active ﬁscal policy (PM/AF). One version of the ﬁscal theory of the price level
emerges as the special case α1 = γ1 =0 .
We use the local results from the linearized (ﬁxed-regime) model to guide para-
meter choices for the non-linear switching model. For most of this paper regime 1






¯ < 1. Regime 2 combines passive monetary policy with active ﬁscal







Regimes follow a two-state Markov chain governed by the transition matrix
Π =
·
p11 1 − p11
1 − p22 p22
¸
, (20)
P [St = j|St−1 = i]=pij, where i,j =1 ,2
and p12 ≡ 1 − p11 and p21 ≡ 1 − p22.10
8Logarithmic preferences make money essential and eliminate Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ’s (1983) spec-
ulative hyperinﬂations as potential equilibria. This allows the Taylor principle, coupled with passive
tax policy, to deliver uniqueness. As Sims (1997) shows, if money is inessential, this policy mix does
not produce a determinant equilibrium.
9The model is speciﬁed to ensure that the problems arising from multiple steady state equilibria,
which Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2001a,b, 2002) emphasize, cannot occur.
10Although our reading of macro policy history and Favero and Monacelli’s (2003) estimates
suggest that monetary and ﬁscal policy have not switched synchronously, as a ﬁrst step we assume
that they do. Full non-synchronous switching would allow the economy to evolve for a time under
policies that are both passive. A PM/PF mix, if it were expected to last forever, yields indeterminacy
of equilibrium. We postpone to later work grappling with the numerical aspects of indeterminacies
and sunspots in non-linear models.POLICY SWITCHING 12
We assume agents observe current and past realizations of regimes and of exogenous
disturbances.
4.3. Competitive Equilibrium. The bounded equilibrium for the economy with
regime-switching policy rules is deﬁned as:
Deﬁnition 1. Given the state vector Φt = {wt−1,b t−1,θ t,ψt,S t}, where wt−1 =
Rt−1bt−1 + mt−1, a bounded competitive equilibrium for the economy consists
of a continuous decision rule for real debt, bt = hb (Φt), and a continuous pricing
function, πt = hπ (Φt), such that
(1) taking sequences {Rt,τt,πt,θ t,ψ t,S t} as given, the representative agent’s op-
timization problem is solved;
(2) the ﬁscal authority sets τt according to (17) and the monetary authority sets
Rt according to (16);
(3) the government budget identity, (5),a n dt h ea g g r e g a t er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t ,
yt = ct + gt, are satisﬁed.
5. A Benchmark Specification
This section describes the computational aspects of a benchmark speciﬁcation,
including the choice of parameter values, the computation of non-linear impulse re-
sponse functions, and details about the numerical solution.
5.1. Parameter Selections. Our objective is to obtain qualitative, rather than
quantitative, implications from the model, and the parameter values were chosen
with that aim in mind. Several parameter choices were based on their implications
for the model’s deterministic steady state, which we set equal across regimes. We take
the model to be at an annual frequency, so we set β = .9615, implying a 4 percent real
interest rate. Output is normalized to 1 and government consumption is 25 percent
of GDP. The debt-output ratio is .4 and inﬂation is 3 percent in the deterministic
steady state; both numbers are in the ballpark for post-war U.S. data. In choosing
the weight on real money balances in preferences, δ, we sought to make the model’s
consumption velocity close to U.S. data.
11 This implied δ = .0296.
The feedback parameters in the policy rules, (α1(St),γ1(St)), were chosen to cor-
respond to values used in the literature. In regime 1–active monetary policy and
passive ﬁscal policy–α1(1) = 1.5, a common value in the Taylor rule literature, and
γ1(1) = .275, implying a very strong response of taxes to debt. In regime 2–passive
monetary policy and active ﬁs c a lp o l i c y – w ec h o s et h er u l e sm o s to f t e na n a l y z e di n
11The average ratio of consumption of non-durables plus services to the real monetary base over
1959-2002 is about 2.4.POLICY SWITCHING 13
the FTPL literature: α1(2) = 0 and γ1(2) = 0, making both the nominal interest rate
and taxes exogenous.
Given the settings for (α1(St),γ1(St)) and the assumptions on the deterministic
steady state values for debt and inﬂation, the intercept terms for the policy rules,
(α0(St),γ0(St)), are determined.
For the benchmark speciﬁcation, we make the transition probabilities between
regimes equal, with the regimes only moderately persistent. With p11 = p22 = .85, the
average regime duration is 6-2/3 years. This duration is briefer than seems plausible,
but it makes the diﬀerences between regimes clear.12
The variances of the i.i.d. policy shocks, (θt,ψ t), are ﬁxed across regimes. We set
σ2
θ =3 .125e − 6 and σ2
ψ =2 .05e − 5. A constant σ2
ψ implies the same-sized tax shock
in each regime: two standard deviations amount to a change in taxes relative to its
stationary mean of about 3-1/2 percent. Because of simultaneity between Rt and πt
in the monetary policy rule, a constant σ2
θ can imply very diﬀerent changes in the
nominal interest rate from a given shock: a two standard-deviation shock to θt lowers
Rt 5 basis points in regime 1 and 35 basis points in regime 2.
5.2. Non-linear Impulse Response Analysis. The methods of Gallant, Rossi,
and Tauchen (1993) are used to assess the dynamic impacts of shocks to ﬁscal and
monetary policy. Impulse response functions report how a shock makes the paths
of variables diﬀer from their baseline paths. We take the baseline to be the regime-
dependent steady state, which is deﬁned as




, is values for the




0¯ ¯ < 
and St−1 = St = j,where j = {1,2}.
For example, the impact eﬀect of an i.i.d. shock to lump-sum taxes on inﬂation,
conditioning on an AM/PF policy (regime 1), is described by









where hπ ¡¯ Φ
¢
is the regime-dependent steady state value for inﬂation. The paths
for inﬂation and debt are then recursively updated, holding regime constant. The
analysis that follows uses derivations analogous to (21) to trace out the impacts of
perturbing one shock, holding all other sources of randomness ﬁxed.
12In section 7 we examine the equilibrium’s sensitivity to variation in policy settings, including
feedback parameters and regime duration.POLICY SWITCHING 14
5.3. Average versus Marginal Sources of Financing. This paper follows Sargent
and Wallace (1981) by emphasizing the ﬁscal ﬁnancing consequences of alternative
monetary and tax policy rules. We wish to highlight a distinction that does not
appear in Sargent and Wallace: there can be an important diﬀerence between the
average and the marginal source of ﬁnancing.13 In the model’s deterministic steady
state direct taxation through τ constitutes over 96 percent of total revenues, leaving
seigniorage to cover a little over 3 percent. Although the means of the stochastic
steady states across regimes diﬀer slightly from the deterministic steady state values,
the message is the same: on average seigniorage is a trivial source of ﬁscal ﬁnancing.
In regime 1 (AM/PF), seigniorage averages about 3.6 percent of total revenues (.99
percent of output), and in regime 2 it averages 3.4 percent (.95 percent of output).
These numbers are consistent with the U.S. evidence that King (1995) cites.
There are three distinct marginal sources of ﬁnancing that exogenous disturbances
may generate. The ﬁrst arises from an instantaneous jump in the price level that
revalues existing nominal government liabilities. The other two sources are dynamic,
arising from changes in the present values of the primary surplus and seigniorage.
































The government’s present value budget identity implies
Bt
Pt
= xt + zt. (24)
After taking expectations at date t of both sides of 24, Cochrane (2001b) refers to
this relationship as a “debt valuation equation,” which he uses to exposit the FTPL.
When expected xt and zt are ﬁx e db yp o l i c yb e h a v i o r ,ab o n d - ﬁnanced tax cut must
13This distinction is sometimes overlooked. King and Plosser (1985), for example, point to the
fact that averaged across time inﬂation ﬁnancing is a trivial source of revenues in the United States
as suggesting that inﬂation taxes should also be inconsequential in response to various shocks to
the economy. In addition, many observers dispute the relevance of the dynamic policy interactions
that Sargent and Wallace describe on the grounds that most developed countries do not rely heavily
on seigniorage revenues [King (1995)]. Castro, Resende, and Ruge-Murcia (2003) draw a similar
conclusion for OECD countries. See Grilli (1989), Cohen and Wyplosz (1989), and Centre for
Economic Policy Research (1991) for related discussions in the context of European Monetary Union.POLICY SWITCHING 15
make Pt jump to ensure the equilibrium value of debt does not change. This is the
instantaneous marginal source of ﬁnancing.
Under diﬀerent policy assumptions, exogenous shocks may bring forth expected
changes in xt or zt. Given the benchmark parameters, when regimes are permanent,
i.i.d. shocks to taxes and to monetary policy generate no change in the present value of
seigniorage in regime 1 (AM/PF), though they do aﬀect the present value of surpluses.
Tax shocks in regime 2 (PM/AF) leave both xt and zt unchanged, while monetary
policy shocks change both xt and zt. In contrast, in the switching model only tax
disturbances in regime 2 leave the present values in (22) and (23) unchanged.14
5.4. Computational Details. It may seem natural to solve the model by ﬁrst lin-
earizing around the regime-dependent steady states. But in the switching model,
policy parameters as well as policy shocks are random variables. For some policies of
interest it can turn out that the one-step-ahead forecast error in inﬂation from the
Fisher relation is correlated with future policy parameters. Linear methods fail to
capture this correlation, leading the approximations to incorrectly classify existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium. Appendices A-C show this in detail for two diﬀerent
linearization methods.
T h ec o m p l e t em o d e lc o n s i s t so ft h eﬁrst-order necessary conditions from the repre-
sentativeagent’s optimization problem, constraints, speciﬁcation ofthe policy process,
and the transversality conditions on real balances and bonds. The solution method,
based on Coleman (1991), conjectures candidate decision rules that reduce the sys-
tem to a set of non-linear expectational ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations. The solution
consists of two functions that yield values for real debt and inﬂation given the state.
The decision rule for real debt and the pricing function for inﬂation are found by
substituting the conjectured rules into the complete model, represented by
Rt = α0(St)+α1(St)h
π (Φt)+θt, (25)













b (Φt)+mt + τt = g + wt−1 (h
π (Φt))
−1 (29)






14If regime 2 set γ1(2) > 0 but small and 0 <α 1(2) < 1, both present values would change.POLICY SWITCHING 16
and wt = Rtbt + mt.
Substituting (25)-(27) into (28) and (29) and using numerical quadrature to eval-
uate the triple integral representing expected inﬂation, reduces the system to two
equations in two unknowns, πt and bt. The system is solved for every set of state
variables deﬁned over a discrete partition of the state space, yielding updated approx-
imations to hπ (Φt) and hb(Φt) at every node in the state space. When evaluating
the integral, non-linear interpolation is used to compute inﬂation for states that lie
oﬀ the discretized state grid. This procedure is repeated until iterations update the
current decision rule by less than some  >0 (set to 1e − 12).
The solution is veriﬁed using three criteria. First, residuals for the government
budget identity and ﬁrst-order conditions must be close to zero on each node of the
state space. Second, we check that the government’s present value budget identity,
(24), holds to some tolerance. Third, the unconditional mean of expectational errors
must be approximately zero in random simulations. We verify suﬃcient conditions by
observing the solution implies stationary paths for real debt and real balances. The
solution is veriﬁed to be locally unique by randomly perturbing the converged rule
and checking that it converges back to the initial rule. Across discrete nodes in the
state space, the largest residual is 2e−15. The convergence criterion was satisﬁed at
each node.
6. Computational Results
This section describes results from the benchmark speciﬁcation and contrasts those
results with predictions from the model with ﬁxed policy regime.
6.1. I m p a c t so fP o l i c yS h o c k si nR e g i m e1( A M / F P ) .The impacts of mone-
tary and ﬁscal policy shocks are reported in ﬁgures 1 (conditioning on regime 1) and
3 (conditioning on regime 2); solid lines are responses to an i.i.d. tax cut and dashed
lines are responses to an i.i.d. monetary easing.
6.1.1. Tax Shocks. In Regime 1, ﬁscal policy would be Ricardian if policy regime were
expected to last forever. A bond-ﬁnanced tax cut brings forth an expectation of future
taxes whose present value exactly equals the increase in the value of debt. With no
change in net wealth, demand for goods is unchanged at initial prices and interest
rates. Unchanged inﬂation implies unchanged nominal rates, leaving the present value
of seigniorage also unchanged.15
15Leeper (1993) reports responses to monetary and tax policy shocks for a closely related ﬁxed-
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When regime can change, agents treat a tax cut as an increase in wealth. Because
t h e yp l a c ep o s i t i v ep r o b a b i l i t yo ns w i t c h i n gt or e g i m e2( P M / A F ) ,w h e r et a x e sa r e
exogenous, the current tax reduction exceeds the expected present value of tax in-
creases in the future. A switch to regime 2 with ﬁxed taxes brings with it a discrete
devaluation of government debt through an increase in the price level. Higher wealth
increases aggregate demand and the current inﬂation rate in this economy with a
ﬁxed supply of goods [ﬁgure 1].
With α1(1) = 1.5 in regime 1, monetary policy reacts to the higher inﬂation rate
by raising the nominal interest rate. This creates an expectation that inﬂation will
remain above its stationary level in regime 1, which is consistent with the anticipated
debt devaluation. With the impulse response functions conditional on regime 1, active
monetary policy propagates the transitory tax cut, generating persistently higher
inﬂation and nominal rates. The persistence is so strong that variables remain away
from their pre-shock levels over 10 periods after the tax cut.
In periods following the tax cut, taxes increase in a manner suggestive of Ricardian
ﬁscal behavior, as regime 1 policy passively raises taxes when debt increases. But
the rise in the value of debt exceeds the present value of these tax increases, with the
diﬀerence made up by an increase in the present value of inﬂation taxes.
Inﬂation exhibits stable responses to policy shocks, as ﬁgure 1 shows. Based on
intuition derived from single-equation linearized models, this outcome may seem coun-
terintuitive. Conditional on staying in a regime with active monetary policy, in lin-
earized models the Taylor principle makes the inﬂation equation unstable: after an
i.i.d. policy shock, inﬂation jumps immediately to oﬀset the eﬀect of the policy shock
on expected inﬂation; in the next period, inﬂation jumps back to its steady-state
value. In the non-linear computational results, by contrast, the response of inﬂation
is serially correlated. Moreover, one might think that, since we have a ﬁscal the-
ory equilibrium, the surprise revaluation of debt must stabilize the debt dynamics
in expectation. But in regime 1 monetary policy is active, so the inﬂation process
must also be stabilized. How can both dynamical equations be stabilized by the same
revaluation?









Et[1/πt+1] = β Rt
πt+1, using the Fisher relation to obtain the equality. η is
a type of expectation error whose economic role is as a revaluation variable. Let η be
determined by the function gPOLICY SWITCHING 18
ηt+1 = g(πt,b t,θ t+1,ψt+1,α 0(St+1),γ0(St+1)). (31)
Holding regime ﬁxed, after a one-time shock the inﬂation dynamics of (30) are de-
scribed by a deterministic system. Taking as given the g function implied by the
computational model, we can calculate numerically the system’s stability properties
in a neighborhood of the regime-dependent steady-state. It turns out that these
dynamics are stable for any point in some neighborhood of the steady state.
The stability stands in contrast to the outcome for a linearized model, where the
Taylor principle creates post-shock deterministic dynamics that are explosive. The
key diﬀerence is that in a linearized model the revaluation variable η can depend
only on i.i.d. shocks. In the computational model, η depends on lagged inﬂation and
lagged real debt, as well as i.i.d. shocks, as in equation (31). In particular, η depends
positively on the lagged inﬂation rate and negatively on lagged real debt. As one
might expect, this dependence on past variables stems from the wealth eﬀects present
in the regime-switching model. Through the Taylor rule, higher πt implies higher
Rt, which leads to higher future interest payments on the debt. Because regime can
switch, agents expect some of those interest payments to be met with seigniorage
in the future. But the impulse response functions in ﬁgure 1 condition on staying
in regime 1, so taxes are surprisingly high, making aggregate demand and inﬂation
surprisingly low, and ηt+1 larger. A higher value of bt, holding Rt ﬁxed, makes wealth
higher at the beginning of period t +1(because of the likelihood of switching to a
regime with exogenous taxes in the future). Higher wealth increases demand and
inﬂation at t +1 , which lowers ηt+1.
Decision rules in the switching environment diﬀer markedly from the rules when
regime is ﬁxed. Figure 2 shows the equilibrium rules for bt and πt under AM/PF
policies for both ﬁxed and switching regime models. The rules are expressed as
functions of ψt and θt, holding all other state variables at their regime-dependent
steady state values. The lower left panel of the ﬁgure illustrates the contemporaneous
impacts of taxes on inﬂation. When regime is permanent Ricardian equivalence makes
taxes irrelevant, but taxes matter when regimes can change.
Regime switching also increases the elasticity of real debt to policy disturbances
by propagating the shocks’ impacts and changing the present values of taxes and
seigniorage [right panels of ﬁgure 2]. For example, as ﬁgure 1 showed, a negative
shock to ψt raises the nominal interest rate and generates an expectation that both
direct and inﬂation taxes will rise in the future, supporting the increase in the current
value of debt. Of course, the higher value of debt is associated with a higher presentPOLICY SWITCHING 19
value of surpluses when the switching model conditions on staying in regime 1 where
γ1(1) = .275.
If agents expect tax policy to be non-Ricardian in the future, having the Taylor
principle hold in one regime is not suﬃcient to oﬀset the inﬂationary impacts of tax
disturbances. Indeed, in that regime the Taylor principle may have the unintended
eﬀect of giving i.i.d. tax shocks persistent impacts, increasing the variances of demand
and inﬂation.
6.1.2. Monetary Shocks. When regime 1 is ﬁxed, a transitory monetary policy shock
creates a one-time increase in inﬂation by the conventional mechanism of a one-time
increase in liquidity. The Taylor principle ensures the nominal interest rate stays
ﬁxed. A decline in the value of debt is matched by a decline in the present value of
surpluses, guaranteeing that both wealth and future inﬂation taxes are constant.
Regime switching alters the eﬀects of a transitory monetary easing by expanding
liquidity and reducing wealth [ﬁgure 1]. Because agents anticipate policy will shift to
PM/AF, they no longer expect lower future taxes to match the decline in debt’s value;
wealth falls. Lower wealth attenuates the liquidity-induced expansion of demand.
Along with the expectation that ﬁscal policy will switch to exogenous taxes comes
the expectation of a discrete drop in the inﬂation rate to revalue debt. The present
value of seigniorage and the current nominal interest rate fall accordingly. Lower
ﬁnancial wealth at the beginning of next period, with no new injections of liquidity,
reduces inﬂation in that and subsequent periods.
Note that the monetary shock generates a small “price puzzle”: a monetary easing
that lowers the nominal interest rate is followed by lower future inﬂation. As we
see below, this pattern emerges because agents perceive there is a chance policy will
change to regime 2 in the future.
6.2. Impacts of Policy Shocks in Regime 2 (PM/AF). Regime 2 policy behav-
ior corresponds to the standard FTPL exercise: both taxes and the nominal interest
rate are exogenous.
6.2.1. Tax Shocks. A permanent regime 2 is the canonical FTPL exercise. Fixed
future taxes and constant current and future interest rates mean that a tax cut
cannot be ﬁnanced by future revenues. At initial interest rates and prices, agents
feel wealthier and try to increase their consumption paths. This increase in demand
drives up the current price level until the value of debt is returned to its original level
and agents are happy with their initial consumption plans. By ﬁxing the interest
rate, monetary policy prevents the tax shock from propagating.POLICY SWITCHING 20
Regime switching does not alter the ﬁxed-regime results [ﬁgure 3]. The current
inﬂation rate jumps to devalue the newly issued nominal debt; on the margin, the
full tax cut is ﬁnanced by a contemporaneous jump in the price level. An unchanged
value of debt is consistent with unchanged present values of taxes and seigniorage.
Money growth reacts passively to the higher price level to ensure the money market
clears at the ﬁxed nominal interest rate. These eﬀects coincide with those under
a ﬁxed PM/AF regime because even though agents impute a positive probability
to a Ricardian tax rule and a Taylor rule in the future, unchanged real debt and
an unchanged present value of surpluses are consistent with such a switch in rules.
Indeed, the decision rules as a function of ψt are identical.
Daniel (2003) considers a once-and-for-all probabilistic shift in tax policy from
being strongly responsive to debt to being exogenous. She maintains that monetary
policy pegs the nominal interest rate forever. In the present setup, Daniel is assuming
the tax rule can switch from regime 1 (γ1(1) > 0) to regime 2 (γ1(2) = 0), while
monetary policy is always in regime 2 (α1(1) = α1(2) = 0). She shows that as long
as the probability is positive that taxes will be exogenous in the future, ﬁscal policy
determines the price level. Because the nominal rate is pegged, there is no mechanism
in Daniel’s model by which a tax shock can be propagated. Even if taxes are currently
in regime 1, therefore, their impacts are those that the present work attributes to
regime 2: a one-time change in the price level that revalues debt.
6.2.2. Monetary Shocks. When regime 2 is ﬁxed, a monetary policy shock at time
t lowers the nominal interest rate and induces oﬀsetting portfolio substitutions by
agents out of debt and into money. With agents’ budget sets unperturbed by the
shock, there is no change in aggregate demand or inﬂation initially. The lower nominal
interest rate creates an expectation of lower future inﬂation and, therefore, seigniorage
revenues (supporting the drop in the value of debt). How is the lower expected
inﬂation realized? Although initial changes in real balances and real debt oﬀset each
other, the drop in Rt makes ﬁnancial wealth, wt, lower at the beginning of period
t +1 . This reduces demand and inﬂa t i o ni nt h a tp e r i o d .
When regime can switch, surprise monetary easing produces a similar pattern of
impacts. The only diﬀerence is the small contemporaneous uptick in inﬂation [ﬁgure
3], which arises because agents impute a positive probability to switching to regime
1 (AM/PF), where expansionary monetary policy raises inﬂation.
With monetary policy in this model couched in terms of an interest rate rule,
the expansionary monetary shock produces a sizeable “price puzzle.” As we explore
in section 8, this pattern of correlation oﬀers an explanation for the “price puzzle”
ﬁndings in the monetary VAR literature.POLICY SWITCHING 21
7. Exploring the Parameter Space
This section considers alternative parameter settings across two dimensions of the
parameter space. First we vary regime duration and report the sensitivity of inﬂation
to taxes when regime 1 (AM/PF) prevails. The benchmark settings for the PM/AF
regime assume the monetary authority sets interest rates independently of inﬂation,
implying tax reductions are ﬁnanced entirely by a contemporaneous inﬂation tax
(as in the FTPL). The second dimension we explore is to allow monetary policy to
respond weakly to inﬂation.
7.1. An Active Monetary/Passive Fiscal Regime. As section 6 demonstrated,
agents’ expectations that regime will switch in the future play a crucial role in de-
termining the impacts of policy disturbances. Here we explore how regime duration
aﬀects the result that tax cuts generate wealth eﬀects in regime 1. The expected
duration of a regime is given by




for j = {1,2} and dj = T −t,w h e r eSt = St+1 = ···= St+T = j and St+T+1 6= j. The
benchmark speciﬁcation assumes that both regimes are relatively persistent: p11 >. 5
and p22 >. 5.
T h ed e g r e et ow h i c ht a xs h o c k sa ﬀect inﬂa t i o ni na nA M / P Fr e g i m ed e p e n d so n
the transition matrix. Figure 4 illustrates how the impact of a tax cut on inﬂation
increases as p11 → 0 and p22 → 1. Each decision rule represents diﬀerent probabilities
in the transition matrix, where
λ =
E [d1|St =1 ]
E [d1|St =1 ]+E [d2|St =2 ]
represents the proportion of time spent in the AM/PF regime. As the expected
proportion of time spent in the PM/AF regime increases, the inﬂation eﬀects of tax
disturbances increase because agents expect to switch to the PM/AF regime in the
future and then remain there longer relative to the AM/PF regime.
As ﬁgure 5 illustrates, the transition matrix aﬀects the sensitivity of inﬂation to a
tax cut. The paths for inﬂation condition on the AM/PF regime and use that regime’s
steady state as the baseline; the tax cut occurs in period 2. As agents expect to spend
relatively more time in the PM/AF regime, a tax cut generates a larger increase in
inﬂation on impact and increases the variance of inﬂation. The larger increase on
impact arises from the expectation of a regime change to a more persistent PM/AF
regime in the near future, which creates a lower expected present value of direct taxes
relative to a scenario where the AM/PF regime is highly persistent.POLICY SWITCHING 22
7.2. A Passive Monetary/Active Fiscal Regime. In the ﬁxed-regime model,
with exogenous taxes and a pegged interest rate, the revaluation of nominal debt
following an i.i.d. shock to taxes occurs instantaneously. But even when regime is
ﬁxed, transitory tax shocks can generate serially correlated changes in inﬂation if
the monetary authority responds weakly to inﬂation (α1 > 0). This prevents the
complete devaluation of nominal debt from occurring in the period of the tax shock.
Instead, a tax cut is ﬁnanced by issuing debt that will be repaid with inﬂation taxes
spread over future periods.
As α1 increases, the monetary authority responds more aggressively to inﬂation and
the tax cut causes a larger increase in the interest rate and a smaller contemporaneous
rise in inﬂation. The higher interest rate, along with a higher real value of debt (due
to a smaller jump in the current price level), induces substitution from real balances
to bonds. As α1 increases, so must the present value of seigniorage following a tax
cut. However, regardless of the value of α1 in the ﬁxed-regime model, the persistence
in inﬂation is quite weak, as the present value of future seigniorage returns to its
initial level relatively quickly. These eﬀects are illustrated in ﬁgure 6 for a tax cut in
period 2.
In the switching model, the positive probability of regime change propagates in-
ﬂation to a much greater degree relative to the ﬁxed-regime model [ﬁgure 7]. With
α1(2) > 0, debt rises more in response to a tax cut because agents expect both
primary surpluses and seigniorage to adjust in the future. Agents impute positive
probability to a change to AM/PF policies where the higher value of debt will be re-
paid with taxes. This generates a negative wealth eﬀect, reducing aggregate demand
and lowering the rate of inﬂation relative to the ﬁxed regime model. These eﬀects are
in place until the policy regime changes.
8. Some Empirical Implications
This section derives twoempirical implications fromthe theoretical regime-switching
environment using time series produced by simulating the benchmark model for
100,000 periods. The simulation allows regime to evolve according to the transition
probabilities in (20) and draws (θt,ψt) from their normal distributions.
8.1. The “Price Puzzle”. The “price puzzle” that emerges from many attempts
to identify exogenous shifts in monetary policy is well documented [Sims (1992),
Eichenbaum (1992), Hanson (2002)]. It was regarded as a puzzle because a monetary
expansion that lowers the nominal interest rate is often followed by lower inﬂation,
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resolve the puzzle by changing identifying assumptions or by expanding the informa-
tion set on which policy choices are based [Gordon and Leeper (1994), Leeper, Sims,
and Zha (1996), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999), Bernanke, Boivin, and
Eliasz (2002), Leeper and Roush (2003)].
Another reaction has been that lower inﬂation following a lower interest rate is not
a puzzle at all. To the extent that ﬁrms must borrow to ﬁnance wage bills and new
investment, lower interest rates reduce the costs of production and can lead naturally
to lower inﬂation, at least for some period [Barth and Ramey (2002), Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2001)].
As suggested in section 6, a positive correlation between the interest rate and future
inﬂation is also a natural outcome of the switching model. It appears subtly under
regime 1 (AM/PF) and forcefully under regime 2 (PM/AF). We now show that if
time series data were generated by this setup, one should expect to ﬁnd that positive
interest rate innovations predict higher inﬂation.
Figure 8 shows the responses of inﬂation and the nominal interest rate to an orthog-
onalized innovation in the nominal rate. Ordering inﬂation before the interest rate
is consistent with much of the VAR work, which treats inﬂation as predetermined,
and is also consistent with estimates of the Taylor rule, which regress the nominal
rate on inﬂation (and potentially other variables). Although the policy disturbances
are i.i.d. and the monetary policy rule is purely contemporaneous, the interest rate
displays substantial serial correlation. Inﬂation rises sharply in the short run, and
remains above its initial level for 10 periods.
The model’s results are consistent with the Hanson’s (2002) careful analysis. He
ﬁnds that the “price puzzle” cannot be solved by the conventional method of adding
commodity prices to the Fed’s information set. And more to the point for the present
work, Hanson ﬁnds that the “puzzle” is more pronounced in the period 1960-1979. But
Favero and Monacelli (2003) identify that period as one where monetary policy was
passive and ﬁscal policy was active. As ﬁgure 3 shows, the model predicts precisely
this outcome when conditioning on PM/AF.
8.2. Surplus-Debt Regressions. A number of authors have computed regressions
of budget surpluses and government debt to draw inferences about the source of
ﬁscal ﬁnancing [Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (2001), Bohn (1998), Janssen, Nolan,
and Thomas (2001)]. Canzoneri, Cumby, and Diba (CCD), for example, estimate a
bivariate VAR with the government surplus and total liabilities.16 Their ﬁgure 3 (p.
1228) reports that a positive innovation in the surplus is followed by persistently lower
16The surplus is deﬁned to include seigniorage and total liabilities are the sum of net government
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liabilities and a surplus that is signiﬁcantly positive for only two periods. They argue
that a Ricardian interpretation of the data is “more plausible” than is a non-Ricardian
one, as the increase in the surplus is used to retire debt.
Simulated data from the regime-switching model produce a pattern of correlation
strikingly similar to the top panel of CCD’s ﬁgure. A positive innovation to the surplus
produces an immediate and persistent decline in liabilities [ﬁgure 9].17 Of course, as
ﬁgure 1 makes clear, even conditional on current tax policy being Ricardian, tax
shocks always generate wealth eﬀects and non-Ricardian outcomes.
Our setup is completely straightforward and plausible. Both a reading of Amer-
ican tax history over CCD’s sample period and the corroborating formal statistical
evidence that Favero and Monacelli (2003) present support the view that monetary
and ﬁscal policy regimes have switched in a manner that our setup aims to capture.
9. Concluding Remarks
In most countries monetary and ﬁscal authorities cannot credibly commit to always
follow either active monetary policy and passive ﬁscal policy or passive monetary pol-
icy and active ﬁscal policy. If, as a consequence, private agents place probability mass
on both kinds of regimes, then something like the regime-switching environment that
we model will apply. That environment makes wealth eﬀects–from both monetary
and tax policy disturbances–important components of policy impacts.
The implications of this switching setup raise some doubts about two pillars of
recent policy analysis. First, because tax changes have wealth eﬀects, even if the
prevailing regime combines the Taylor principle for monetary policy with taxes that
respond strongly to debt, Ricardian equivalence may be a misleading benchmark.
Second, if the Taylor principle holds in only one regime, it can actually be destabilizing
in the sense that it propagates disturbances and can increase the variance of aggregate
demand and inﬂation.
There are at least two dimensions along which to extend the current framework.
Is it possible for both policy authorities to act passively in one regime, yet have
the price level uniquely determined? The analytical example in section 3 shows this
is possible. The current computational approach must be modiﬁed to deliver and
appropriately characterize a solution with multiple equilibria or sunspots, as Lubik
and Schorfheide (2003a) have done for linear models. The second extension addresses
the question: how “big” are the ﬁscal eﬀects when the current regime is AM/PF? To
17Given the paucity of independent disturbances in the model and the simple form of the tax rule,
which excludes any contemporaneous response to other variables, in the reverse Choleski ordering–
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address this, we need a carefully calibrated model with frictions, possibly of the kind
in the workhorse New Keynesian model extended to include long-term government
debt as in Cochrane (2001a). In the New Keynesian model monetary policy has
more conventional macro eﬀects, in addition to the ﬁscal ﬁnancing eﬀects this paper
analyzes. With such a model in hand, we could also extract a more complete set of
empirical implications.Appendix A. Why Linear Methods Fail
This appendix examines the suitability of various linearization approaches to solv-
ing the regime-switching model. Our conclusion is that none of these linearization
approaches can be expected to give an accurate characterization of the stability of the
full non-linear system in all of the cases of interest to us. This conclusion is somewhat
surprising, given the nearly linear dynamics of the full system. Essentially, linearized
models miss the role of the endogenous expectation error in determining the long-run
behavior of the system. Since the qualitative properties of the dynamics are deter-
mined by the system’s long-run behavior, these linearized models fail to present an
accurate picture of it. In particular, they may fail to classify existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium correctly.
To get an intuitive sense of the problem with linearized models, consider ﬁrst a
straightforward linearization around a deterministic steady-state associated with one
of the regimes. For the next few paragraphs, we will work with a simpliﬁed version of





− γ1tbt−1 + g − γ0t − ψt, (32)
where (γ0t,γ1t) are the regime-dependent parameters of the tax rule, (γ0(St ),γ1(St )).
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bt−1 + g − γ0t − ψt. (33)







∆bt−1 + g − ∆γ0t − ψt +
b
β
∆ηt − b∆γ1t, (34)
where ∆b ≡ bt − b,a n db is the steady-state value of real bonds under one of the
regimes.
In the single-regime version of the model, the expectation error is i.i.d. and, there-
fore, the linearized version accurately captures the stability properties of the model.
(See end of appendix C for proof.) However, in the full non-linear regime-switching
model, the expectation errors ηt are correlated with γ1t+k,k > 0.C o n s e q u e n t l y , ηt








in general, the long-run properties of the linearized model will be diﬀerent from thosePOLICY SWITCHING 27
of the full non-linear model, as the long-run behavior is governed by the expected
value of such products.18
Now consider an alternative linearization approach. Since the equilibrium policy
functions in this model appear to be nearly linear, one might imagine that a state-
contingent linearization approach would be successful in reproducing the long-run
properties of the full system. In this case, at each date we linearize around the












Again, when η is deviates signiﬁcantly from its unconditional mean of unity, the long-
run dynamics of the random-coeﬃcient models may fail to represent the stability
properties of the full system.
To get a sense of the importance of this possibility, we can compare the results
of the linearized models to the full non-linear model for special parameter values for
which it is possible to solve the full model exactly. Suppose that monetary policy
obeys the rule
Rt =e x p ( α0t + α1tπ1t + θt).
Using the Fisher equation, and using the deﬁnition of the endogenous expectation
error, the dynamics for inﬂation can be written as
b πt+1 = α1tb πt + θt + α0t +l nβ −b ηt+1,
where ˆ denotes the natural log of the variable.
In appendix B, we show how to determine some long-run properties of this diﬀerence
equation. For certain parameter values it will turn out that imposing stability on
the inﬂation process is suﬃcient to determine the mapping between inﬂation and
the exogenous shocks. These are the determinate Ricardian equilibria of this model.
Having solved for π, we can then obtain an expression for the endogenous expectation
error η.
Now return to the government budget identity (this time with seigniorage):
18This possibility precludes using many of the standard second-order accurate expansions available
in the literature. Typically, it is an assumption of these methods that the ﬁrst-order linearization
accurately determines the long-run behavior of the system and this assumption is not necessarily







bt−1 + Υt, (36)
where Υt ≡
mt−1
πt − mt + gt − γ0t − ψt. The solution for π implies that inﬂation
depends only on the current regime St and realization of the monetary policy shock,
θt. Therefore, Υt depends only on current and lagged θ and S. Appendix C shows
that the stability of this equation can be determined because η has been determined
by monetary policy behavior.
In Ricardian equilibria, we can compare the results of the full non-linear model
with those of the straightforward linearization around a single steady state. Results
are predictably poor and we will not describe them in detail. More interestingly,
we can also compare the random-coeﬃcients linearization with the non-linear model.
With the random-coeﬃcients model, however, the only qualitative diﬀerence between
the two models arises in results concerning the stability of the process for government
debt: the random-coeﬃcients model may suggest stability when the non-linear model
is not stable and vice-versa.
As a baseline, consider the model with γ1(1) = .275 and γ1(2) = 0, p11 = p22 = .99,
α0(1) = −.5, α0(2) = .5. With this setting, the two linearization schemes report that
the bond dynamics are stable if inﬂation dynamics are. However, such is not the case
in the non-linear system. Figures 10-12 report the results of varying α1 systematically
between 1 and 5. The lightly-shaded areas represent regions identiﬁed as Ricardian
by both linear methods and by the exact solution to the non-linear system; in this
area, linear methods are accurate. Areas shaded in the middle tone are regions of
the parameter space that do not support an equilibrium in the non-linear system,
but which are equilibria for the linearized system: linear methods fail in this area.
Finally, dark regions are areas that, according to the non-linear model, lie outside of
the Ricardian space, including non-Ricardian and indeterminate equilibria.
As is apparent from ﬁgure 10, with the baseline settings there is a substantial region
in which the linearized methods fail to capture the long-run behavior of the system,
even though the dynamics conditional on regime are nearly linear. Intuitively, these
results arise because the regimes are long-lived, while inﬂation behavior may diﬀer
substantially across regimes. Say, for example, that inﬂation is much higher in regime
1 than in 2. Then, when the system switches from regime 1 to 2, the inﬂation rate
falls and so η is large. Moreover, while in regime 2, the inﬂation rate is persistently
and substantially below expectations, since households form their expectations taking
into account the possibility of switching back into the high inﬂation regime 1. The
growth rate of debt is therefore higher than the ex ante real interest rate, at thePOLICY SWITCHING 29
same time that taxes fail to respond to lagged debt. A linearized model with state-
contingent coeﬃcients recognizes that debt is explosive in this regime. However, it
may not accurately reﬂect the covariance between interest payments on debt and tax
policy and, hence, may misclassify the stability properties of debt.
To gauge the sensitivity of the model to these eﬀects, we varied several parameters
of the baseline, including the persistence of the regimes, the standard deviations of
the shocks and the intercept terms in the monetary policy rule.19 Results of these
variations are presented in ﬁgures 11-12. Reducing the persistence of the regimes leads
to smaller diﬀerences in inﬂation behavior between regimes. Correspondingly, the
forecast errors, on average, are not as large, while also not as informative about future
tax policy, reducing the correlation between ηt and γ1t+k,k>0. Linear methods then
are quite successful in tracking the long-term behavior of the system, as shown in
ﬁgure 11, which increases the transition probability to .70. Increasing the gap between
the intercepts in the two regimes increases the spread in inﬂation rates across regimes
and for similar reasons the performance of linear models becomes commensurately
poor. (Figure 12 presents results from a run with the intercepts set at 1 and -1.
The region of the parameter space over which the linear model mis-characterizes the
long-run behavior of the model is much larger than the corresponding region for the
baseline.)
Nevertheless, given our wish to explore the parameter space over fairly broad re-
gions (including non-Ricardian regions) and with relatively persistent regimes, the
linearized models are clearly not suitable. With widely separated, persistent regimes,
the expected growth rate of debt is signiﬁcantly aﬀected by much lower-than-expected
(or higher-than-expected) inﬂation rates. Neither of the linearization approaches
matches this feature of the non-linear model, and so cannot match its dynamics in
general.
Appendix B. Stability Properties of Random-Coefficient Linear
Models
For our purposes, it is suﬃcient to consider the stability properties of a simple
univariate model of the following form:
xt = a(St−1)xt−1 + ξt−1 + Ψηt,
where a(St−1) follows an M-state Markov chain, ξt is an exogenous shock process
possibly depending on both the state of the Markov chain and on Q additional i.i.d.
19A l t e r i n gt h ev a r i a n c eo ft h ei.i.d. shock does not have a very dramatic impact on the performance
of the linear model. Therefore, we do not display a graph for this case.POLICY SWITCHING 30
processes Θt and ηt is an endogenous expectation error satisfying the restriction
Etηt+1 =0 . Let the transition matrix of the Markov chain be given by Π,w h e r e
Πij = prob(st+1 = i|st = j). Finally, the expectation Et is taken with respect to
the time t information set {xt−j,S t−j,ξt−j,ζt−j|j ≥ 0},w h e r eζ represents a non-
fundamental (“sunspot”) shock.
We are interested in the behavior of Etxt+T as T becomes large. Iterating forward




































a(St = k) · prob(St+1 = l|St = k),
for k ∈ {1,M}.


























t |•)) = 1 × M. With this notation, the previous recursion relation




t |•)Γ(a). Accordingly, Et(a
(l)
t |•)=ωΓl(a),w h e r e
ω is a 1 × M vector of ones and Γl(a) denotes a matrix product.
From this relation, it follows that for j>1,
Et(a
(l)
t+jξt+j−1|St = m)= PM
n=1prob(St+j−2 = n|St = m)
PM
k=1Et+j−2(ξt+j−1|St+j−1 = k,St+j−2 = n)












where µij ≡ Et(ξt+1|St+1 = i,St = j) · prob(St+1 = i|St = j).POLICY SWITCHING 31
For j =1 , Et(a
(l)
t+1ξt|St = m)=ξtωΓl(a)Π.
Finally, the endogenous expectation errors can be handled as follows. Consider
terms of the form d(St)ηt.T h e nd e ﬁne the basis random variables χj(St) associated
with the Markov state St,w h i c ha r ed e ﬁned so that χj(St)=1if St = j and 0
otherwise.








where εt is uncorrelated with the χj and Θt. Note that Eta
(l)
t+j|St = m is measurable



















l=1 blΘlt. Ultimately, therefore, we can treat
the expectation errors just as we treat the ξ, since any dependence on the sunspot
shocks ζ drops out of the expectations of interest.
From here on, let us assume that Γ and π have M distinct non-zero eigenvalues. Fur-
ther, let x(i),i=1 ...M, be the state-contingent mapping of the i.i.d shocks into stable
solutions of the diﬀerence equation, at time t. Finally, deﬁne X ≡ diag(x(1)...x(M)),














Now decompose Γ and Π into linear combinations of projectors onto their eigen-
vectors: Γ(a)=
PM
j=1λjPj(Γ(a)) and Π =
PM
j=1 φjPj(Π). Then the sum over future






























Therefore, the long-run expected properties of x are characterized by the number of
explosive roots of Γ.
Appendix C. Solving a Ricardian Model
From the Fisher equation and the monetary policy rule, we have that
1/Rt = βEt1/πt+1 =e x p ( −α1tπt − α0t − θt),POLICY SWITCHING 32





we can rewrite these equations in logs as
b πt+1 = α1tb πt + θt + α0t +l nβ −b ηt+1.
In this case, b η i sn o tm e a n - z e r o ,a si sa p p a r e n tf r o mi t sd e ﬁnition. Therefore, we
decompose b η into its mean and deviations from the mean: b ηt+1 = e ηt+1 + Etb ηt+1.
Because the monetary policy shock is i.i.d., the mean is purely dependent on the
Markov state St.F r o mh e r eo n ,l e tνt(St)=Etb ηt+1.
In terms of the formalism from the previous section, we take xt =ˆ πt and α1t =
at. For the sake of convenience, consider the case in which the intercept α0t =0 .
W r i t t e ni nt h i sf o r m ,i n ﬂation dynamics are of the form described in Appendix B,

















where, as above, X denotes the initial state-contingent values of the log-inﬂation
process.




λm−φn is invertible, so, assuming that both roots of


































































Γ(α1) · X · Π















+( 1− 1/α1(1),1 − 1/α1(2))θt =0 .
Finally, after some further algebra with this expression, we can obtain explicit
solutions for the inﬂation function. In this case, the inﬂation function is very simple:
ˆ π(St)=−θt/α1(St).
With the intercept term, we would have obtained ˆ π(St)=−θt/α1(St)+ ∆(St),
where ∆(St) depends on the still-undetermined Etb ηt+1. This term can be determined
by imposing the condition that Etηt+1 =1 .
Substituting the result for ˆ π(St),w eh a v e


































This condition, for each initial St, is suﬃcient to determine ∆(St).
Once the expectations errors η have been determined, the long-run properties of
the bond dynamics can be derived using a variation of the methods in Appendix B.
When steady-state inﬂation rates are diﬀerent across regimes, the relevant eigenvalues


































=( 1 /β − γ1)
k.POLICY SWITCHING 34
This result holds when the conditional mean of γ1 is independent of the initial state.
Thus, under these circumstances, the state-contingent linearization scheme will per-
fectly capture the long-run behavior of the full non-linear system.POLICY SWITCHING 35
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Figure 1. Impacts of Policy Shocks Conditional on Regime 1 (AM/FP)POLICY SWITCHING 41





















































































Figure 2. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Decision Rules in Switching- and
Fixed-Regime ModelsPOLICY SWITCHING 42



































































































Figure 3. Impacts of Policy Shocks Conditional on Regime 2 (PM/AF)POLICY SWITCHING 43
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Fixed−Regime : PM−AF 
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Figure 4. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Contemporaneous Impact of Taxes on
Inﬂation as a Function of λ, Proportion of Time Spent in Regime 1.POLICY SWITCHING 44
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λ  = .75
Figure 5. Regime 1 (AM/PF): Response of Inﬂation to Tax Cut in
Period 2 as a Function of λ, Proportion of Time Spent in Regime 1.
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Figure 6. Fixed Regime (PM/AF): Response of Present Value of
Seigniorage to Tax Cut in Period 2 as a Function of the Monetary
Policy Response of the Interest Rate to InﬂationPOLICY SWITCHING 45






























α  = .1
α  = .2
α  = .3
α  = .4
Figure 7. R e g i m e2( P M / A F ) :R e s p o n s eo fP r e s e n tV a l u eo fS e i g n i o r -
age to Tax Cut in Period 2 as a Function of the Monetary Policy Re-
sponse of the Interest Rate to Inﬂation














Figure 8. Responses to a Nominal Interest Rate Innovation: Using
Data Simulated from Regime-Switching ModelPOLICY SWITCHING 46




































Figure 9. Responses to a Surplus Innovation: Using Data Simulated
from Regime-Switching Model
Figure 10. Light shading: linear methods and nonlinear model agree;
middle shading: linear methods imply existence, nonlinear model
implies nonexistence; dark shading: nonlinear model implies non-
Ricardian ﬁscal policy or indeterminacy.POLICY SWITCHING 47
Figure 11. Light shading: linear methods and nonlinear model agree;
middle shading: linear methods imply existence, nonlinear model
implies nonexistence; dark shading: nonlinear model implies non-
Ricardian ﬁscal policy or indeterminacy.
Figure 12. Light shading: linear methods and nonlinear model agree;
middle shading: linear methods imply existence, nonlinear model
implies nonexistence; dark shading: nonlinear model implies non-
Ricardian ﬁscal policy or indeterminacy.